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Abstract The concept of the ‘well-being of the child’ (like
the ‘child’s welfare’ and ‘best interests of the child’) has
remained underdetermined in legal and ethical texts on the
needs and rights of children. As a hypothetical construct that
draws attention to the child’s long-term welfare, the well-
being of the child is a broader concept than autonomy and
happiness. This paper clarifies some conceptual issues of the
well-being of the child from a philosophical point of view.
The main question is how well-being could in practice
acquire a concrete meaning and content for a particular issue
or situation. A phenomenological-hermeneutic research per-
spective will be outlined that allows the child’s well-being to
be elucidated and specified as an anthropological and ethical
idea. It is based on a contextual understanding of generative
relationships, a combination of the theory and practice of
making sense, here described as ‘generative insight’, which
could provide ethical guidance for decision making in fami-
lies, legal practice, medicine or biomedical research.
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1 Introduction
Children’s health and flourishing can be infringed in many
ways, by human interference, social circumstances, or
through natural causes. Cultural traditions and historical
eras differ in their understandings of what is special about
childhood, of what constitutes the child’s special vulnera-
bility, and of the minimum (and optimum) requirements of
a child’s life. This heterogeneity in the conception and
realization of childhood, and the many ways children are
exposed to harms or threats, result in varying levels of
protection of children’s needs. The UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child (1989) emphasizes that ‘‘In all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or pri-
vate social welfare institutions, courts of law, administra-
tive authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration.’’ (Art. 3.1) It
grants children the right to life and development, to a
name, to free expression of his/her views, to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, the right not to be illicitly
separated from his/her parents, to enjoy the highest
attainable standard of health, to an adequate standard of
living, to be protected from economic and sexual exploi-
tation, and so on. This legally binding instrument of
international law is also an ethical guideline that defines a
set of minimum requirements as non-negotiable standards.
It strongly emphasizes that children’s well-being and best
interests should override any other political, social or
individual interests and considerations of such authorities
or institutions. However, the underlying concept of the
‘well-being of a child’, or of ‘a child’s best interests’,
cannot easily be deduced from such a list of children’s
rights. Many rights are negative rights and others identify
necessary requirements for the child’s well-being in a very
general sense. But they do not explain the concept of well-
being itself. There are many possible interpretations, each
presuming a vision of good human development that is
dependent on a particular and rich cultural understanding
of the good life and of human relations. The child’s well-
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being and best interests therefore remain vague and are not
positively defined in national legislation.1
The aim of this paper is to clarify the concept of well-
being of the child from a philosophical point of view. We
shall discuss how it acquires concrete meanings. This
requires, furthermore, to understand how it is structurally
embedded. A research perspective will be outlined that
would allow the child’s well-being to be used as a nor-
mative idea to guide decision processes and actions within
legal, familial, medical, and other contexts.
After a few remarks on terminology (1), we organize the
paper around the following questions: What is specific to
the concept of well-being concerning children? (2) What
can we know about it? That is, how can we as adults gain
insight into the concrete and philosophical challenges of
the well-being of a child? (3) Which themes and questions
are important in general for understanding well-being and
what we could call ‘unwell-being’? Obvious themes are the
‘good life’, the quality of the relationships within which the
child lives, and justice. Since young children cannot or can
only partially make decisions for themselves, the aspect of
the child’s future becomes more pertinent in evaluating the
well-being of a child. How can these temporal dimensions
of well-being be articulated? (4)
2 Terminology
1. In many but not in all contexts, the terms ‘well-being’,
‘welfare’ and ‘best interests’ of the child can be used
interchangeably. Although we do not argue for a sys-
tematic distinction between them in this paper, we do
point out differences whenever appropriate. Whereas
‘well-being’ more directly refers to ideas about the
‘good life’ of a child in a biographical context and
emphasizes health and happiness—or disease, impair-
ment, and pain—‘welfare’ adopts a more societal
perspective, emphasizing the primary goods and free-
doms, while ‘best interests’ refers to what is in favor of
the individual child over the long-term and emphasizes
the claims children would have good reason to make, if
they could speak for themselves. It may be more clo-
sely related to the Anglo-American tradition of liber-
alism, focussing especially on the rights of children,
the implicit or explicitly uttered interests of the child,
the will, and the objective and long-term interests of
the child. ‘Well-being’ and ‘best interests’ are closely
related, however, since to be well must surely be in the
child’s best interests. Well-being and welfare may be
associated to the tradition of Roman law. Well-being
concerns both the subjective aspects of feeling well
and the objective aspects of care, support, and
protection.
2. In many cases, neither well-being per se nor its
infringement or neglect seem appropriate to describe
the situation. Since the concept of the well-being of a
child must remain under-determined, legal or ethical
texts instead refer to its counter-term: the endanger-
ment of the child. When a child is physically or
emotionally mistreated, abused, or neglected, some-
body is clearly acting against his or her well-being, but
well-being in the long-term is not rendered impossible.
On the other hand, if a child is not endangered, abused,
or neglected, it might still not be fully well. Hence, the
term ‘the well-being of the child’ often serves a
technical function by pointing out how children should
not be treated. The notion of child endangerment
hinges upon someone—who has the legal or moral role
of adopting a responsible, supportive, caring relation to
the child, usually the parents—who is made account-
able for endangering the child (cf. Rosenheim et al.
2002).
3. In addition to the rather holistic concepts of well-being
and the counter-term child endangerment, we intro-
duce the unwell-being of the child as a specific
concept. We say, a child is unwell if she/he is sick,
is under duress, in pain or fear, suffers from malnu-
trition, etc., or is feeling unwell. A child might be
acutely unwell but yet one would not speak of
endangerment, and a child welfare office would not
consider separating the child from the family or
caretaking institutions. Examples are abundant: if a
family has lost a member by accident, a bereaved child
can be acutely unwell but her/his well-being may still
not be endangered. In many medical situations, parents
face questions of compromise: a child may be acutely
unwell as a result of medical treatment, which however
is necessary for restoring health or saving its life in the
longer term. Well-being and unwell-being are there-
fore not symmetrical terms.
4. In legal terms, childhood begins with birth and ends at
a certain age (18 in most countries). Socially, psycho-
logically, and culturally, the point at which a person
ceases to be a child is however ambiguous. The
adolescent may in certain respects still be a child, but
in other respects already be mature. Legal definitions
may set an age limit to childhood but cannot remove
this phenomenological complexity. In everyday life we
sometimes expand the use of the term beyond any age
limit, when we say for instance that we all remain the
children of our parents.
1 Because of its vagueness and indeterminate meaning, Steindorff
(1994, 1–6) observes that the well-being of a child is an ‘‘empty box’’;
according to Figdor (2009) it is an unsuitable basis for professional
decision-making.
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The well-being of the child relates to the physical, mental,
personal, cultural and social development which results in a
meaningful life with other humans (Schu¨es 2013). Thus,
we must think about what children need (their basic needs),
what they want (a child’s will) and what they are entitled to
(children’s rights). We also need to see how the basic
needs, the child’s will and the child’s rights are properly
addressed and implemented within the family and in the
society in which they live. Therefore, a deeper under-
standing of the child’s well-being, and a more precise
account of acting in the best interests of children, must rely
on a interdisciplinary inquiry that includes philosophical
anthropology, ethics, psychology, law, cultural and social
studies. This inquiry must be based on the descriptive and
the normative dimensions of all aspects relevant to the
child’s present life, her or his relationships, and future
perspectives.
3 What is Specific to the Concept of Well-Being
for Children?
Current philosophical approaches to well-being explain the
notion ‘well-being’ in general by reference to a list of basic
human capabilities, basic needs, to pleasures and pains, or
to human desires (Crisp 2008). The latter two approaches
determine well-being rather formally and hence cannot
point out particulars of the content of children’s well-
being. ‘Objective list theories’ such as the capability
approach (Nussbaum 2011) or the needs or rights of chil-
dren (Alston et al. 1992) seem more promising because
they make the specific contents of children’s well-being
explicit. However, we argue that such objective lists need
to be complemented by an approach to what we call gen-
erative relationships.
By generative relationships we mean primarily familial
relationships across generations that are constituted
through birth, parenting, and education. ‘Generativity’ or
the adjective ‘generative’ refer to an intersubjective,
familial, historical, and socio-cultural process in which a
child is born into and lives in the world. Therefore,
‘‘generative experiences occur in between generations;
therefore, they are always intergenerative’’ (Schu¨es 2012,
89). The term ‘‘generativity’’ stands for the psychological
and social context of becoming, which takes place within a
generation and in-between different generations: It is
realized in different kinds of relationship, such as parents-
child relationships, sibling relationships, or grand-parents-
child relationships. Generativity means, secondly, the
social and historical process over generations. Thus, it
includes different generations and reaches over them.
Thirdly, the term generativity stands for the biological or
corporeal intertwinement within the family which includes
two or three or more generations (Schu¨es 2008; Steinbock
1995; Husserl 1973, 171). Fourthly, as Maurice Merleau-
Ponty has pointed out, generative relationships are the basis
for the development of both individuality and personhood
in general: ‘‘our birth, or […] ‘generativity’ is the basis
both of our activity or individuality, and our passivity or
generality’’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 428; cf. Schu¨es 2008,
p. 323ff.).
When we refer to family or to parenthood we are not
referring exclusively to those people involved in biological
parenthood. An African proverb says: ‘‘It takes a village to
raise a child.’’ Both the objective and subjective aspects of
generative relationships are necessary for the development
of personality, as well as for happiness and satisfaction in
life. Familial and caring relations are central to the child’s
flourishing; yet children are also made vulnerable through
these very relationships. They are born into relationships
and they must cope with their particular features through-
out their lives. Most adult relationships include the freedom
to end them, should they turn out to be difficult or harmful.
Children can rarely change their parental or familial rela-
tions of their own choice. If a parental relationship is
changed or broken, this would be, rather, due to the choice
of adults (e.g. through divorce), or as a consequence of
tragic events (e.g. the death of a parent), or in the case of
child endangerment, the decision of state authorities.
A phenomenology of generative relationships could start
with a list of children’s rights as provided by the UN
Convention, for example. If children are abused, neglected
or beaten, or live in realities of violence, their well-being is
endangered or completely absent. An objective (in the
sense of being ascribed from a third person perspective) list
of the necessary elements of well-being identifies the basic
needs of a child that must be both legally and ethically
recognized: children are in need of happiness, love, and
understanding, stable living conditions and secure familial
relations; they need good nutrition and health care, pro-
tection and support against physical and social dangers,
such as physical or emotional violence, or economic and
sexual exploitation; they need knowledge, education, and
experience, in order to become a mature individual with
selfhood and a social identity, and a responsible member of
the community. If some of these needs are not taken care
of, are neglected or violated by parents or carers, we speak
of child endangerment. However, what all these aspects
mean and how they hang together depends on an under-
standing of the psychological and moral status of a child,
the subjective perspectives of the persons involved, the
qualities of the child’s relationships, and of the situation in
its social and cultural contexts.
Several aspects of a list must be based on children’s
subjective perspectives in order to fully grasp the context
and their individual needs. However, since children always
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live in concrete relationships and social contexts, their
subjective perspective is already relational, embodied, and
specifically situated. Subjectively and objectively, children
are in need of supportive and good generative and other
social relationships. These are as important to living as
water and air.
There is an obvious but important difference between
the general concept of well-being, which focuses on mature
persons, and the well-being of a child, in terms of the status
of autonomy and will. Mature adults are recognized to have
the capacity to decide for themselves and to utilize their
capacities of autonomous agency. Hence, to respect their
dignity, respect for their autonomy is the key. Cases where
an adult cannot decide for her- or himself are seen as
exceptional and treated as such. Adults are basically free to
decide how to look after themselves. An adult may ruin her
health, her capacities or her possibilities for development,
for instance by drug abuse.2 It is part of Western juridical
culture to allow this to happen, even if ethically one might
not want to approve of it. When it concerns a child, who is
considered as being in the phase of immaturity, his/her
development are the focus of education in terms of ‘culti-
vation’ (Siep 1994, 294). We do not allow children to ruin
their development. In most countries, a 12-year-old is not
considered free to decide to quit school and to waste her
mental capacities. For the sake of its long-term welfare,
limits are therefore placed on the will of a child. A similar
observation can be made in medical contexts. Children’s
growing selfhood is considered as a basis for their partic-
ipation in decisions. In decision-making about treatment, a
12-year-old girl must be heard, she must be allowed to feel
respected, but she would need to be very compelling in
order to convince her family not to continue a life-saving
treatment. Does well-being always essentially include
autonomy, or is well-being of the child independent of the
child’s developing autonomy? As a hint to answering this
question we suggest two things: firstly that the well-being
of the child includes the acknowledgment of her will rel-
ative to her maturity and circumstances; secondly, the child
must be given the space and the possibility to develop the
capacity for self-determination and autonomy later in life.
For most authors (see references in Hagger 2009, ch. 2;
Schickhardt 2012, ch. 6), recognition of the child’s own
will is part of the well-being of the child. Child psychiatrist
Reinhart Lempp said that any will, including that of adults,
can easily be influenced. Upbringing and education always
exert some influence on the will, and children might even
have a right to be influenced. Yet the importance of the will
does not change with the child’s age, only the way in which
it is expressed (Lempp 1983, p. 111). Limits to the will,
however, are set where its consequences would endanger
well-being (Dettenborn 2010). At this point we go in cir-
cles: although the child’s will must be recognized and
respected, in the name of well-being, if the child expresses
a decision that acts against its well-being—from the per-
spective of the caregiver or responsible third person—then
it will be overruled.
If the child is to participate, capacitation is needed. To
be capacitated the child needs qualitatively good, sup-
portive relations. Both capacitation and respect for the will
of the child are also based on cultural conventions about
how to treat children well and how to see childhood.3 The
aspects we have described as being key for well-being are
historically and culturally not universal. As we have for-
mulated them, they grew out of the European tradition of
human rights.
Less dependent on cultural premises is the experience of
an unwell-being of a child. However, the terms well-being
and unwell-being, as we have already said, are asymmet-
rical: unwell-being means that the child is not feeling well,
that it faces a difficult situation, is sick, or is not getting a
good education, that life is gray or the family relationships
are poor. These things can pass. Most of them do not
necessarily harm the long-term well-being of the child. If
we think that the well-being of a child is seriously at risk,
however, we immediately think about the future and
overall long-term dispositions. Semantically, the terms
unwell-being and child endangerment are counter-terms to
the notion of the well-being of the child. In order to elu-
cidate the concept of well-being itself, the counter-terms
are inadequate because of their asymmetry; further insight
is therefore needed. But what kind of insight? What can
insight achieve?
4 Generative Insight: A Research Perspective
We have pointed out that a description of the well-being of
the child in concrete contexts needs both an objective (third
person) and a subjective (first person) perspective. Well-
being is not established by causal relations between a
subject and objects, but is embedded in a relational struc-
ture of intentions and feelings, values, and norms. There-
fore, well-being cannot be determined in an essentialist
way. It is founded and lived in social and generative
practices. Generative practices concern the experiences of
2 Health insurance companies or social costs may act as deterrents to
maltreating oneself.
3 Philipp Arie`s (1975) argued that in the Medieval period, the child
was treated as a ‘miniature adult’; in the 18th century, childhood
received a special social and moral status. Jean Jacques Rousseau
pronounced the ‘age of childhood’. Since the work of Jean Piaget,
Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, Joseph Goldstein and others, the
understanding of childhood has been heavily influenced by develop-
mental psychology (Zalazo 2013; Mitchell and Ziegler 2012).
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and relationships between generations, the upbringing and
care of children, support for those in need, and the arrival
and passing away of persons who belong to the structure of
generativity. We need to focus on the meanings that are
established within those practices. The dimension of
meanings can be directly examined in a hermeneutic-phe-
nomenological approach to generative relationships, which
we call generative insight (Schu¨es 2007, pp. 235–238).
Generativity in reference to the epistemological concept
of insight means, on the one hand, the genesis of meaning
as a narrative and interpretative process of meaning pro-
duction. On the other, it means the relational processes
between generations, which include a bodily, mental,
social, and cultural intertwinement. Insight, as we use it
here, is a term that belongs into phenomenological moral
philosophy and means the grasping of the salient, essential
aspects of a situation, seeing the basic structures of a
context of meanings and narratives. Insight is a kind of
thinking and perceiving that is opposed to mere beliefs and
to detached and abstract argumentation. Its rationality is
closely related to what Aristotle described as phronesis or
‘practical wisdom’. Generative insight therefore is a pro-
cedure of thinking, empathy and perception, which, in
regard to a concrete question or problem, grasps the par-
ticular content and coloration (including the struggles,
tensions, atmospheres) of generative relationships. The
question of what the well-being of a child in a concrete
situation implies, is a question of moral practice and the-
ory, different from a particularist ‘case by case approach’.
This question is important for the people involved in
these concrete situations, for how they make sense of them
and what they do in practice. It is not merely a topic of
research in a general interest. What we want to explain here
about the practice of ‘insight’ is therefore both a strategy
for gaining insight for people involved, and a strategy of
research in philosophy and anthropology. Bringing up
children well, deciding for children in practical matters or
problematic situations well, presupposes having insight
into the social, generative, and individual conditions and
meaning-constitution of well-being.
Insight has two sides: it can be understood in the sense
of both ‘gaining’ insight and ‘having’ insight. Gaining
insight addresses the idea that insight is a dynamic form of
knowledge that arises from an interaction of rational cri-
teria and empathy. It is always lived praxis and theoretical
observation. Having insight refers to the meaningful con-
text of a concrete theme and its narrative constitution.
Insight refrains from immediate judgments about moral
prescriptions. It introduces an interval in which clarifica-
tion can occur. As Paul Ricœur formulated, a narrative of
how a situation can be understood and lived is the ‘‘first
laboratory of a moral judgment’’ (Ricœur 1990, p. 167,
own transl.). That means the way a situation is described
and told has a strong influence on how a morally difficult
issue is seen and decided upon.
This triad of description, narration, and judgment
(Ricœur 1990) is best addressed by a phenomenological
approach, because phenomenology is a descriptive science
of experiences and a search for the constitution of mean-
ings by asking how they appear and how they are believed
and on what basis and prejudices. It is concerned with the
structures of experience as they appear to humans in their
subjective consciousness and interpretations.
Since the time of Plato, philosophy has distinguished
between knowing by empirical facts or cognition and
knowing by insight. The first is valuable within a broad
concept of philosophical anthropology. The latter refers to
grasping the most striking aspects and essential meanings,
i.e. the basic meaningful structures of an issue. This dis-
tinction is important because, as we have seen, the well-
being of the child is not an empirical notion but rather a
‘‘hypothetical construct’’ (Dettenborn 2010, 49) which is
used in very different contexts, in order to draw attention to
the child’s perspective and subjectivity. Well-being, child
endangerment, or the unwell-being of the child cannot be
just empirically determined. The key is to have an idea of
which questions to ask and which themes to bring up.
Obviously, empirical knowledge of the situations is also
necessary for this.
Since the well-being of the child does not depend upon
the children themselves but on their good care by the
family or carers and on the quality of the relationships and
the social context in which they live, a methodological
approach is needed to address the generative and social
relations that are basic for a child. The concept of gener-
ative insight contains the presupposition that every human
being is born into, and that therefore everybody lives and
has lived within a social and generative relational structure.
The main point in referring to a generative structure is
that the child is always seen as a concrete bodily, gendered,
culturally situated human being and never abstractly pos-
ited in fictive isolation, devoid of human relationships. This
understanding of generative insight focuses on the whole
generative context and always asks about the welfare of the
concrete relationships which are or must be lived by a
child.
By reference to different forms of insight, we can
address the triad of description, narration, and judgment: a
situative function of insight gives a general description of
circumstances, a generative function of insight might
explicitly address aspects of the generative relationships in
a biographical narrative, and a normative function of
insight tries to interpret the norms and values involved.
One advantage of such a phenomenological approach to
generative insight is that it combines structural thinking
with concrete perception. It refers to a child as always
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living in the generative structure that establishes a society,
and it tries to analyze the underlying questions and
meanings. For this it needs to listen to all voices involved.
Insight also needs time. There are forms of instantaneous
insight into a situation that see what one ‘must’ do now. But
there are also forms of more slowly growing insight that
need time to get settled and to be developed step by step.
5 Questions and Themes of the Well-Being and Unwell-
Being of a Child
We assume as a fundamental belief that the well-being of a
child is understood and developed with regard to (a) a good
life for this child. The regard for the good life, however,
implies a sense for (b) justice. Justice implicitly refers to
other humans who are (c) in relation to the child. The
thematization of the child’s development in its generative
context and in reference to the ‘good life’ brings up (d) the
underlying temporal dimension of the well-being of a
child. The structural relation between these four aspects
can be explained in the following way: If we wish that a
child is well we must also wish that he or she has a good
life. Having a good life means to live in relationships and
social institutions that are not characterized by severe
injustice. The experience of severe injustice and being
unjustly treated is not compatible with living a good life.
Justice is a relational term because it takes place between
humans. Therefore, for the child’s well-being we also need
to consider the quality of relations in which the child lives
and with which she or he is faced. More than just clarifying
the individual child’s autonomy and happiness, this situates
the child explicitly in a relational and generative context.
Since the well-being is directed toward the good life in the
long term, the underlying temporal dimensions need to be
discussed.
5.1 Good Life
The notion of good life is used to describe a way of life that
is desirable. Ursula Wolf (1999; cf. Susan Wolf 1997)
insightfully argues, with reference to the Aristotelian
notion of eudaimonia, that the notion of the ‘good life’
cannot be explained through some hedonistic conception of
pleasure or a notion of luck but rather in terms of how
somebody can and may live in a meaningful way. A good
life is a meaningful life. The notion of meaning is under-
stood as a relational structure of self and world (Wolf
1999). Therefore, the question ‘what is a good life?’ must
be reformulated in the sense of how to live a good life and
how to help somebody else live a good life. The good life is
not a concept like a container in which goods are held; a
meaningful way of life is built within structures of
relationships and concrete contexts in which sense or
meaning can be experienced. Therefore, a good way of life
is one that succeeds in being meaningful with regard to
oneself and with others. The interpretation of such mean-
ingfulness itself depends upon the other, and reflects back
to the experience of life itself.
Hence, the ‘meaning of life’ is to be found in interpre-
tation. Interpretation is based on the ‘inter-relation’ of
oneself and others, in the description of experiences, in the
narration of the lived stories, and in the moral judgment of
what seems right or wrong. This interpretative interrelation
is addressed by the hermeneutic-phenomenological per-
spective of generative insight. It is essentially interpreta-
tion and the attempt to make sense. It relates practice and
theory, experience and meaning, the concrete and the
general. Interpretation is part of its meaning constitution.
Therefore, to argue that the concept of well-being of a child
should be understood and actually lived in regard to a good
life, also implies the obligation to support the child in
living a meaningful life. This can only be achieved if carers
share with the child the different insights they might have
into their surrounding world and the stories of which it is
made up. The interpretation of well-being in regard to a
good life is important also ethically because it influences
decision-making practices.
If a child’s well-being is harmed, development towards
the good life is not furthered. But this is not a simple
exclusion. We all know that in life, periods of unwell-being
can happen. Illness does not mean that a good life becomes
impossible. The unwell-being of a child is not necessarily a
sign of bad relationships; poor health or difficult circum-
stances might not immediately be a sign of child endan-
germent. Whether or not it may hinder the path to a good
life cannot be decided in general terms.
5.2 Justice
The well-being of the child is to be found in reference to
institutions, their social contexts and relations. If they are
unjust, then the child will feel (or is) mistreated and unc-
ared for. Charles Dickens (2003, p. 60) has the orphan Pip
say: ‘‘My sister’s bringing up has made me sensitive. In the
little world in which children have their existence, who-
soever brings them up, there is nothing so finely perceived
and so finely felt, as injustice.’’
Justice has two sides: legal rights and the ethically right
or good. The sense of justice is not to be found in the
juridical dimension, yet it is often challenged or changed
by it. The idea of justice in an ethical sense is developed in
human relationships. From an objective standpoint, rela-
tions can be said to be just or unjust, but from a local
perspective humans share an acute sense of justice or
injustice within their relationships (Moore 1978).
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The notions of justice or injustice refer to institutions
and their relational structure. Institutions are historically
grown communities, such as nations, religious groups, or
families. As Ricoeur pointed out (1990, p. 227), their
structure cannot be reduced to individual relations, yet they
are based on such relations. Many institutions are based on
the equality of their members; they infer justice accord-
ingly, following an egalitarian approach. Yet a ‘generative’
institution such as a family is based on inequality. Their
members need very different kinds of care and intimacy,
hence in this context justice has to be based on a non-
egalitarian model. But nevertheless, if close carers place a
child in a situation of severe injustice, the well-being of the
child can be violated; the life of the child in that situation
cannot be considered as a good life. Acts of solidarity or
help are often considered to be family duties, which would
not be considered a duty in other contexts. Thus, for the
concept of the child’s well-being, the question of justice is
closely linked to the meaning and status of generative
relationships.
Beside injustice also misfortune is relevant for a child’s
well-being. Judith Shklar has drawn attention to the con-
ceptual difference between these terms. ‘Injust’ may be
something which is experienced as avoidable and alterable,
whereas pure ‘misfortune’ suggests inevitability and unal-
terability (Shklar 1990, p. 58). The child’s well-being can
be reduced or endangered by both but is experienced in
different meanings and with different implications for the
carers’ responsibilities.
5.3 Relationships
If it is true that a child (as any other human) is always in
relation with others, questions arise about the qualities of
such relationships. The quality of a relationship should be
understood specifically in regard to the well-being of the
child. The child cannot choose the relationships or the
family s/he wants to live in. A child is born into them
(Schu¨es 2008, p. 445ff.). Therefore, generative insight into
the relational structures and an ethics of relationships are
key for clarifying the concept of well-being. Any child will
live in more or less close relationships. Children live in
families, in an intergenerational and a wider social context.
If the quality of generative relationships is too poor, we
can speak of the child’s well-being as endangered. The
familial relation is a specific we-relation (Husserl 1973,
p. 428ff.), characterized by a particular ‘‘generative den-
sity’’ (Steinbock 1995, p. 215). In terms of the family, each
member is identified as one part. A sister would not be a
sister without a sibling. At their best, familial relationships
are characterized by trust, care, intimacy, participation, the
readiness to stand by each other in difficult situations and
as a last recourse. A meaningful life needs other humans
who together constitute concrete, meaningful experiences
and relationships (Schu¨es 2012, p. 98). The familial rela-
tion cannot be reduced to individual relationships, say
between the mother and the daughter, yet the quality of the
individual relationships is the basis for the overall rela-
tional structure in which a child grows up. Questions
concerning the well-being of the child may arise when we
ask which tasks a child needs to fulfill because of being
part of a family and because of sharing a close familial
relationship.
One example is the transplantation of blood stem cells
(bone marrow) between siblings as Jodi Picoult vividly
describes in her novel My Sister’s Keeper (Picoult 2004).
Some ethicists have argued that because of intrafamilial
obligations family members have responsibilities for one
another’s welfare, including the duty to donate bone mar-
row, because they share an ‘‘intimate family relation’’
(Ross 2009, Kesselheim et al. 2009; Committee on Bio-
ethics 2010). The child, according to this approach, has an
obligation to help by undergoing the procedure of bone
marrow donation, and bears responsibilities for the sibling
regardless of his or her own benefit. The normative content
of the family relationship is a system of duties; therefore it
is presupposed that the donor sees his/her act as one of
helping, but not as a violation of his/her interests, inflicted
by parents or doctors. But this way of putting the case
presumes one perception by the child—whether it per-
ceives the donation as helping the sibling or harming him/
herself. It is a kind of ‘proxy perception’ by the decision-
making person who needs to justify proxy consent. ‘‘The
most plausible justifications for donation by minors are the
best-interest standard, the intimate-attachment principle,
and the appeal to intrafamilial obligations.’’ (Kesselheim
et al. 2009, p. 415) The authors appeal to these three
positions because they want to see a donation by ‘‘a non-
intimate biological sibling’’ as not justified.4 How intimacy
is constituted and how far it reaches normatively is how-
ever an open question. In a previous paper we have argued
against the position that intimacy grounds such duty on the
part of a child (Schu¨es and Rehmann-Sutter 2012). We
would rather argue that this can be a situation in which the
temporary unwell-being of the donor child must be
accepted, with regret. The only choices are either having a
child who dies or taking the chance of a cure, and this cure
implies the injury and temporary unwell-being of the donor
child. The question of whether this is child endangerment
4 Lainie Friedman Ross (2009) agrees with the argument from
intimacy but claims that the question of whether a particular child is
an appropriate donor should be discussed before HLA testing and that
such children should have an advocate. In his response, Kesselheim
(2009) reemphasizes the primacy of parents’ decision making and the
problematic length of time when debates come before the individual
testing.
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or just a kind of unwell-being will actually be decided
within the specific qualities and meanings of the family
relations, which include empathy and the justifications
given to the child. The question is: How can they live with
it? Can they live with it well? And how will they cope?
If the quality of the relationships is poor, or a child is
maltreated, well-being is endangered. The ruin lies in the
broken trust, in violence or in the violation of integrity, as
well as in the perceived meaninglessness of life decisions
and the path of life. Violence cannot be undone by inter-
preting it differently, by talking it away for example by
saying: ‘‘the slap in your face was only for your own
good’’. However, the interpretations and narratives parents
use, for instance before and after a bone marrow trans-
plantation, are crucially important to the well-being of the
child and its development in regard of a good life.
5.4 Temporality
Development towards a good life is essentially temporal. It
is always about the future. Questions of the good life
involve several temporal aspects. The question of how we
want to live is related to the questions of how we like to
spend our time (Rosa 2005) and how should children spend
their time. What activities, spaces, contexts, and relation-
ships are suitable for children? Childhood as a phase of life
passes quickly. This time, and the time thereafter, can be
spent in a more or less meaningful way. Thus, it may be
that children have to find their own path of life that makes
sense to them.
If one associates the well-being of the child with the
idea of a good life and with the wish of the parents or
caregivers for the children to have a good life in the future,
then the question must be posed of how the future is per-
ceived. Joel Feinberg’s well-known concept of ‘‘the child’s
right to an open future’’ (Feinberg 1980; Davis 1997, 2009)
does not adequately explain the future dimension of well-
being. He argues that it is important that one keeps chil-
dren’s future open. If one understands him to mean that
parents should not predetermine the child’s life in a very
strict sense, that they should not interfere physically into
body shape, we would agree. However, if well-being is
directed towards a good life in the sense of having a good
future, a more complex appreciation of the relationship
between present and future seems necessary. A good future
is not merely an open future. Education, knowledge,
emotional, esthetic and ethical formation result in making
possible (enabling) certain paths of life and preventing
others. To take an example: most parents wish that the
upbringing they give their child does not lead to the life
path of a criminal or an alcoholic. Parents support the
development of a strong character in their children in order
to make sure that later on they will successfully find their
appropriate life path. Finding the balance between
strengthening the character, giving guidance to a certain
desired path, and leaving the future open in certain respects,
needs concrete generative insight. Children need a kind of
guidance that enables their future competence to decide by
themselves. Their whole good life is at stake in the present.
6 Conclusion
The concepts of autonomy and happiness are certainly too
thin to account for all the ethically important contents of
the well-being of the child. We have tackled the well-being
of the child as bordered by the counter-terms of child
endangerment and the unwell-being of the child. Yet we
have argued that it is not possible to isolate in any con-
vincing way an essential, universal meaning of well-being.
Autonomy and happiness cannot do this job; any kind of
pre-determined definition fails to account for the social,
cultural, or individual heterogeneity and complexity con-
tained in the idea of a child’s well-being. Nevertheless,
insight into concrete issues and contexts, and insight into
what people understand and perceive as the well-being of
the child, have an important impact on decision-making
and practice with regard to children.
The method of clarifying the concept of the well-being
of the child and the path of constituting its meaning are
intertwined and need continuous explanation. Insight into
the well-being of children is generative, insofar as it is a
concept which is embedded in a sense of genesis, based in
a temporal dimension, and directed towards the good life as
a meaningful life, sensitive to the justice of the relational
structure and the social context, and to the quality of the
relationships themselves. Therefore, the well-being of the
child is a relational concept which demands a hermeneutic-
phenomenological approach for its clarification that we call
‘generative insight’. This includes rational criteria as well
as empathy. It is both theory and praxis.
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